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Introduction
This document specifies a base profile for X.509 v3 Certificates and X.509 v2 Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) for use by applications that support the United States National Security Agency's Commercial National Security Algorithm (CNSA) Suite [CNSA] . The profile applies to the capabilities, configuration, and operation of all components of US National Security Systems that employ such X.509 certificates. US National Security Systems are described in NIST Special Publication 800-59 [SP-800-59]. It is also appropriate for all other US Government systems that process high-value information. It is made publicly available for use by developers and operators of these and any other system deployments.
This document does not define any new cryptographic algorithm suite; instead, it defines a CNSA compliant profile of [RFC5280] . It applies to all CNSA Suite solutions that make use of X.509 v3 Certificates or X.509 v2 CRLs. The reader is assumed to have familiarity with RFC 5280. All MUST-level requirements of RFC 5280 apply throughout this profile and are generally not repeated here.
In cases where a MUST-level requirement is repeated for emphasis, the text notes the requirement is "in adherence with RFC 5280". This profile contains changes that elevate some SHOULD-level options in RFC 5280 to MUST-level for this profile; this profile also contains changes that elevate some MAY-level options in RFC 5280 to SHOULDlevel or MUST-level in this profile. All options from RFC 5280 that are not listed in this profile remain at the requirement level of RFC 5280.
The reader is also assumed to have familiarity with these documents: term flexibility in meeting their IA interoperability requirements. The purpose behind this flexibility is to avoid vendors and customers making two major transitions in a relatively short timeframe, as we anticipate a need to shift to quantum-resistant cryptography in the near future.
NSA is publishing a set of RFCs, including this one, to provide updated guidance concerning the use of certain commonly available commercial algorithms in IETF protocols. These RFCs can be used in conjunction with other RFCs and cryptographic guidance (e.g., NIST Special Publications) to properly protect Internet traffic and dataat-rest for US Government National Security Systems.
Conventions
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
General Requirements and Assumptions
The goal of this document is to define a base set of requirements for certificates and CRLs to support interoperability among CNSA Suite solutions. Specific communities, such as those associated with US National Security Systems, may define community profiles that further restrict certificate and CRL contents by mandating the presence of extensions that are optional in this base profile, defining new optional or critical extension types, or restricting the values and/ or presence of fields within existing extensions. However, communications between distinct communities MUST conform to the requirements specified in this document when interoperability is desired. Applications may add requirements for additional noncritical extensions but they MUST NOT assume that a remote peer will be able to process them. The signature algorithm applied to all CNSA Suite certificates and CRLs MUST be made with a signing key generated on the curve P-384, or that is an RSA-3072 or RSA-4096 key, and with the SHA-384 hashing algorithm.
RSA exponents e MUST satisfy 2^16<e<2^256 and be odd per [FIPS186-4].
The requirements of this document are not intended to preclude use of RSASSA-PSS signatures. However, CAs conforming to this document will not issue certificates specifying that algorithm for subject public keys. Protocols that use RSASSA-PSS should be configured to use certificates that specify rsaEncryption as the subject public key algorithm. Protocols that use these keys with RSASSA-PSS signatures must use the following parameters: the hash algorithm (used for both mask generation and signature generation) must be SHA-384, the mask generation function 1 from [RFC8017] must be used, and the salt length must be 48 octets. The rsaEncryption OID is intended to be used in the algorithm field of a value of type AlgorithmIdentifier. The parameters field MUST have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier.
The object identifier used to identify the PKCS #1 version 1. The ECDSA signatureValue in an X.509 certificate is encoded as a BIT STRING value of a DER-encoded SEQUENCE of the two INTEGERS.
RSA
The RSA signature generation process and the encoding of the result is RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as described in detail in PKCS #1 version 2.2 [RFC8017] 5.3. Version
For this profile, Version MUST be v3, which means the value MUST be set to 2.
SubjectPublicKeyInfo

Elliptic Curve Cryptography
For ECDSA signature verification keys and ECDH key agreement keys, the algorithm ID id-ecPublicKey MUST be used.
The parameters of the AlgorithmIdentifier in this field MUST use the namedCurve option. The specifiedCurve and implicitCurve options described in [RFC5480] MUST NOT be used. The namedCurve MUST be the OID for secp384r1 (curve P-384) [RFC5480] .
The elliptic curve public key, ECPoint, SHALL be the OCTET STRING representation of an elliptic curve point following the conversion routine in section 2. interoperability purposes, all relying parties MUST be prepared to process the uncompressed form.
The elliptic curve public key (an ECPoint that is an OCTET STRING) is mapped to a subjectPublicKey (a BIT STRING) as follows: the most significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the most significant bit of the BIT STRING and the least significant bit of the OCTET STRING becomes the least significant bit of the BIT STRING [RFC5480] .
RSA
For RSA signature verification keys and key transport keys, the algorithm ID, rsaEncryption MUST be used.
The parameters field MUST have ASN.1 type NULL for this algorithm identifier [RFC3279] .
The RSA public key MUST be encoded using the ASN.1 type RSAPublicKey per section 2.3.1 of [RFC3279] .
Certificate Extensions for Particular Types of Certificates
Different types of certificates in this profile have different required and recommended extensions. Those are listed in this section. Those extensions from RFC 5280 not explicitly listed in this profile remain at the requirement levels of RFC 5280.
6.1. CNSA Suite Self-Signed CA Certificates
In adherence with [RFC5280] , self-signed CA certificates in this profile MUST contain the subjectKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and basicConstraints extensions.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical. The keyCertSign and cRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and nonRepudiation bits MAY be set. All other bits MUST NOT be set.
In adherence with [RFC5280] , the basicConstraints extension MUST be marked as critical. The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint MUST NOT be present.
6.2. CNSA Suite Non-Self-Signed CA Certificates
Non-self-signed CA Certificates in this profile MUST contain the authorityKeyIdentifier, keyUsage, and basicConstraints extensions. If there is a policy to be asserted, then the certificatePolicies extension MUST be included. The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical. The keyCertSign and CRLSign bits MUST be set. The digitalSignature and nonRepudiation bits MAY be set. All other bits MUST NOT be set.
In adherence with [RFC5280] , the basicConstraints extension MUST be marked as critical. The cA boolean MUST be set to indicate that the subject is a CA and the pathLenConstraint subfield is OPTIONAL.
If a policy is asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be marked as non-critical, MUST contain the OIDs for the applicable certificate policies and SHOULD NOT use the policyQualifiers option. If a policy is not asserted, the certificatePolicies extension MUST be omitted.
Relying party applications conforming to this profile MUST be prepared to process the policyMappings, policyConstraints, and inhibitAnyPolicy extensions, regardless of criticality, following the guidance in [RFC5280] when they appear in non-self-signed CA certificates.
CNSA Suite End Entity Signature and Key Establishment Certificates
In adherence with [RFC5280] , end entity certificates in this profile MUST contain the authorityKeyIdentifier and keyUsage extensions. If there is a policy to be asserted, then the certificatePolicies extension MUST be included. End entity certificates SHOULD contain the subjectKeyIdentifier extension.
The keyUsage extension MUST be marked as critical.
For end entity digital signature certificates, the keyUsage extension MUST be set for digitalSignature. The nonRepudiation bit MAY be set. All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be set.
For end entity key establishment certificates, in ECDH certificates the keyUsage extension MUST BE set for keyAgreement, and in RSA certificates the keyUsage extension MUST be set for keyEncipherment. The encipherOnly or decipherOnly bit MAY be set. All other bits in the keyUsage extension MUST NOT be set.
